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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction to hear this case is granted under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1992). The court may hear Smith's cross-
petition pursuant to Rule 48, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Petitioner Pearl H. Steffensen has presented the 
following questions for review: 
I. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously apply a harmless 
error analysis after it determined that the trial court committed 
error by directing verdict in favor of Defendant/Respondent 
Smith's Management Corporation ("Smith's")? 
II. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously classify foresee-
ability and, in essence# overrule a Utah Supreme Court case hold-
ing that Jury Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but that the error 
was harmless? 
III. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously affirm the exclu-
sion of evidence in contravention of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
and Utah Supreme Court cases? 
Defendant/Respondent Smith's presents this additional ques-
tion for review: 
Did the Court of Appeals erroneously determine that the trial 
court had erred in partially directing verdict as to activities of 
Smith's prior to the time it knew the shoplifter was committing a 
crime and apprehended him? 
The issues are questions of law which are reviewed for cor-
rectness. State v. Humphrey» 823 P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Smith's agrees with Mrs. Steffensen's statement of the case 
except that Smith•s motion for partial directed verdict was based 
upon the argument that training in the area of deterrence and 
failure to use deterrence were, as a matter of law, not sufficient 
proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1216 at 2-6) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although somewhat embellished and conclusory, Mrs. Steffen-
sen's statement of facts is accurate and sufficient for this re-
view. It is important to note that, until Mr. Burnett left the 
checkout line, Smith's employees only suspected the possibility of 
shoplifting, not the likelihood. (T. 60-61) The Smith's employ-
ees apprehended Mr. Burnett without incident and were accompanying 
him peacefully to the store's office, nearly arriving before he 
fled. (T. 136-139) Up until the time Mr. Burnett actually fled, 
there was no indication that he would do so. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central issue in this matter is whether the trial court 
properly directed partial verdict. There are two items to evalu-
ate prior to directing verdict. The first is whether the plai-
ntiff established, as a matter of law, a prima facie case. The 
second and subsequent evaluation, relied upon by Mrs. Steffensen, 
is whether reasonable minds could reach different factual conclu-
sions based upon the evidence. The trial court made its determi-
nation by evaluating the law. The Court of Appeals, however, 
skipped the prima facie case evaluation and looked only to the 
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second issue. Had it evaluated the facts against the law to de-
termine whether a prima facie case was established, the Court of 
Appeals would have reached the same conclusion as the trial court: 
that a directed verdict was proper. 
Even if there were an error in granting a partial directed 
verdict, that error is harmless. The Utah Supreme court has used 
harmless error analysis in the past in cases dealing with directed 
verdicts and that analysis is appropriate in this case. 
Jury Instruction No. 32 is, in substance, consistent with 
Utah law on foreseeability. Even if the minor deviation in the 
instruction amounts to error, that error is harmless because the 
outcome of the case would not be different. The Court of Appeals 
was correct in finding any error to be harmless. 
The trial court has discretion in limiting evidence and the 
exercise of that discretion may be overturned on appeal only by a 
showing of clear abuse of discretion. The exclusions of evidence 
to be offered by Mrs. Steffensen's expert are consistent with the 
language and purpose of Utah's rules of evidence. Mrs. Steffensen 
has failed to show clear abuse of discretion by the trial court, 
both before the Court of Appeals and in the present review. Ab-
sent this abuse of discretion, the trial court's evidentiary rul-
ings must stand. 
The Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the trial 
court's evidentiary rulings. 
The only serious error in the Court of Appeals decision on 
review of this case is its finding that the trial court erred in 
directing a partial verdict. Even in light of that, Mrs. Steffen-
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sen has failed to make the required showing of substantial preju-
dice to overcome the proper conclusions that any errors committed 
were harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
Much of the argument in this case involves the concept of 
"likelihood" as opposed to "possibility" or "suspicion." For this 
reason it is helpful to examine some definitions of the applicable 
terms. 
likelihood, probability. Clark v. Welch, C C A . Mass., 
140 F.2d 271,273. The word imports something less than 
reasonably certain. 
probable. Having the appearance of truth; having the 
character of probability; appearing to be founded in 
reason or experience. Having more evidence for than 
against; supported by evidence which inclines the mind 
to believe, but leaves some room for doubt; likely. 
possible: Capable of existing, happening, being, becom-
ing or coming to pass; feasible, not contrary to nature 
of things; neither necessitated nor precluded; free to 
happen or not; contrasted with impossible. In another 
sense, the word denotes improbability, without excluding 
the idea of feasibility. 
Black's Law Dictionary. 5d (1979) (emphasis added). Compare, 
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage (1989). Note that likelihood is less than certainty but 
more than possibility. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED VERDICT TO 
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF ACTIONS PRIOR TO THE 
POINT AT WHICH SMITH'S HAD A DUTY TO PROTECT 
MRS. STEFFENSEN FROM THE ACTS OF THE SHOP-
LIFTER. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DETERMINATION 
THAT THE DIRECTED VERDICT WAS IMPROPER WAS 
ERRONEOUS. 
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The real issue in this case is whether the trial court prop-
erly directed verdict in favor of Smith's. The trial court could 
have simplified this case by directing a verdict on the basis 
that, as a matter of law, the evidence did not support a breach of 
a subsequently arising duty. Instead it entered the realm of 
proximate cause. The Court of Appeals erroneously implied that 
the directed verdict was improper, based solely on an analysis of 
proximate cause, and then determined the error to be harmless. 
This holding unnecessarily complicates this case. 
At trial and before the Court of Appeals, Mrs. Steffensen 
concentrated her evidence and arguments on the issues of training 
in and exercise of deterrence. Inadequate attention was given to 
proving that the actions after Mr. Burnett's apprehension caused 
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. Only in her brief before this court 
does Mrs. Steffensen attempt to raise post-apprehension actions as 
causation and only then as they relate to the exclusion of evi-
dence as to Smith's training program. It is in context of this 
emphasis on training in deterrence that the trial court evaluated 
Smith's motion for partial directed verdict. 
There are two steps required in the proper analysis of wheth-
er a directed verdict is appropriate. First, the court must de-
termine whether the evidence presented is legally sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case. After deciding this threshold ques-
tion, the court then must evaluate, as discussed by petitioner, 
whether reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusion arising 
from the evidence. If the evidence does not, as a matter of law, 
establish a prima facie case, it is unnecessary for the court to 
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address the second question. 
A. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED ESTABLISHES A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE. A DIRECTED VERDICT IS A PROPER METHOD OF DEALING WITH 
EVIDENCE WHICH DOES NOT MEET THIS TEST. 
It is up to the court to determine whether the evidence pre-
sented by a party establishes a prima facie case. DeMille v. 
Erickson, 462 P.2d 159, certiorari denied 90 S.Ct. 1531, 397 U.S. 
1079, 25 L.Ed.2d 814. A motion for directed verdict is a proper 
method of testing the legal sufficiency of the evidence (i.e., 
whether a prima facie case has been established). Cerritos Truck-
ing Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982). 
On appeal of a directed verdict, the Supreme Court determines 
whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
party against whom the verdict was directed, establishes a prima 
facie case. Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984). In Cerritos Trucking, the 
Supreme Court evaluated the defendants' evidence in light of es-
tablished case law and authorities, concluding as a matter of law 
that the evidence did not and could not establish a prima facie 
case and holding that a directed verdict was proper. Cerritos 
Trucking at 611-12. 
The critical determination in the present case is whether 
Mrs. Steffensen's evidence could, as a matter of law, have estab-
lished a prima facie case of negligence against Smith's. 
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B. AS A HATTER OF LAW, SMITH'S OWED NO DUTY TO PROTECT MRS. 
STEFFENSEN FROM ACTS OF MR. BURNETT PRIOR TO HAVING KNOWLEDGE 
THAT A CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED. LIKEWISE, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, EVIDENCE AS TO LACK OF DETERRENCE TRAINING OF STORE 
PERSONNEL PRIOR TO THE TIME KNOWLEDGE OF A CRIMINAL ACT EX-
ISTED COULD NOT ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE. 
It is well-established law that four elements make up a prima 
facie case of negligence: (1) duty owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) injury to the defendant, 
and (4) proximate (legal) cause. E.g., Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 1991). If, as a 
matter of law, Smith's owed no duty to the plaintiff, evidence of 
actions prior to the time the duty arose is irrelevant to the 
issue of Smith's negligence. 
Utah law imposes no duty on Smith's prior to the time it 
knows that a criminal act is likely to occur. Dwiggins v. Morgan 
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). A business owner is not an 
insurer of the safety of its business invitees. Id. 
Comment f to section 344 [Restatement, (Sec-
ond) Torts] makes it clear that the possessor 
"is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any 
care until he knows or has reason to know 
that the acts of a third person are 
occurring, or are about to occur." (Emphasis 
added.) Consistent with our earlier cases, 
we follow the Restatement and hold that this 
duty exists in Utah, but recognize that the 
duty does not arise until the business owner 
knows, or should know, that criminal acts are 
likely to occur. 
Dwiggins at 183 (emphasis in original). Note that the standard is 
likelihood and not possibility or suspicion. If there is no duty, 
the trial court need not address the secondary issues related to 
the negligence claims. Id. 
The evidence presented at trial did not show that Smith's 
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knew or should have known that Mr, Burnett was going to commit a 
crime. True, Smith's employees suspected the possibility of shop-
lifting. Steffensen v. Smith's at 485. Even so, that suspicion 
did not amount to knowledge that a criminal act was likely to 
occur. In fact, Mr. Burnett got into line at the checkout stand, 
an act which would suggest the unlikelihood of a crime being com-
mitted. Smith's did not know that a criminal act was likely to 
occur until Mr. Burnett left the checkout line and walked toward 
the exit. 
As a matter of law, Smith's owed no duty to protect Mrs. 
Steffensen until the point at which Mr. Burnett left the checkout 
line and proceeded to the door. Dwiggins at 183. It could not 
breach that duty until it arose. As such, it had no duty to use 
deterrence measures prior to knowing a crime was likely to occur. 
Evidence of actions or inactions by Smith's prior to the time its 
duty arose are irrelevant to the issue of proximate cause based 
upon breach of that duty. Stated differently, evidence of actions 
or inactions taken prior to the establishment of the duty do not 
support a prima facie case based upon breach of that duty. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A PARTIAL VERDICT BASED 
UPON MRS. STEFFENSEN'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DETERMINATION THAT THE DIRECTED 
VERDICT WAS IMPROPER IS ERRONEOUS. 
Smith's requested a partial directed verdict that, as a mat-
ter of law, even if its employees had been inadequately trained in 
matters of deterrence and failed to properly deter, those actions 
occurred prior to the time the duty arose and were not a breach of 
the subsequent duty, so that any lack of training and deterrence 
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were not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. The 
trial court instructed the jury that "all Smith's conduct prior to 
the stop and detention of Mr. Burnett should not be considered by 
the jury." Steffensen at 485-86. In essence, the trial court 
determined that, as a matter of law, prior to the time of appre-
hension there was no duty and therefore the acts or omissions 
prior to apprehension could not proximately (legally) cause the 
injuries. 
The trial court exercised its responsibility to determine, as 
a matter of law, that a prima facie case was not established by 
the evidence. Viewing all of the excluded evidence in a light 
most favorable to Mrs. Steffensen, it is clear that it dealt with 
actions and inactions prior to the time a duty was established by 
law. Consistent with the rationale in Cerritos Trucking. Mrs. 
Steffensen could not establish a prima facie case on those facts 
and the directed verdict was proper. 
The Court of Appeals evaluated only whether reasonable minds 
could differ as to whether the excluded evidence supported Mrs. 
Steffensen's allegations of Smith's negligence. It failed to 
analyze whether the evidence, as discussed above, established a 
prima facie case and failed to determine whether, as a matter of 
law, the directed verdict was proper. Without addressing this 
first crucial step, the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded 
that the directed verdict was improper. 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF THE DIRECTED VERDICT HERE ERRONEOUS, 
THE COURT OF APPEALS COULD PROPERLY HOLD THAT 
ERROR TO BE HARMLESS. 
A. A HARMLESS ERROR STANDARD IS APPROPRIATELY APPLIED TO DIRECT-
ED VERDICTS AND HAS BEEN USED BY THIS COURT IN THE PAST. 
Mrs. Steffensen argues that "A directed verdict is only ap-
propriate when the trial court is unable to conclude that reason-
able minds would not differ on the facts from the evidence pre-
sented." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 11) As discussed in Point I, 
this is only the second of a two step analysis in determining 
whether to direct a verdict. If this two step analysis had pro-
duced an improper directed verdict, Mrs. Steffensen would still 
have to show prejudice such that the error did not amount to harm-
less error. 
Mrs. Steffensen claims that this Court has never, in forty 
years, held an erroneous directed verdict to be harmless error. 
That does not conclusively support her position that harmless 
error analysis does not apply to directed verdicts. In fact, this 
Court has on at least two occasions applied harmless error analy-
sis in appeals of directed verdicts. 
In Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1981) the Su-
preme Court applied a harmless error analysis to deal with an 
alleged error in the trial court's denial of a directed verdict in 
favor of plaintiff. Without deciding whether the refusal to di-
rect a verdict was error, the court determined that if it were 
error, it would be harmless. Jd. at 1042. 
In Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 
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(Utah 1982) the Supreme Court also applied a harmless error analy-
sis, concluding that the trial court erred in weighing the evi-
dence prior to directing the verdict but holding that the actions 
"did not result in prejudicial error since the defendants were not 
entitled to succeed in any event." Id. at 613. 
This matter is complicated by the Court of Appeals' analysis 
of the directed verdict issue as being one only of credibility of 
the evidence. However, as in Cerritos Trucking, Mrs. Steffensen's 
evidence failed to legally establish a cause of action such that 
she could not succeed, regardless of whether reasonable minds 
could differ on the factual interpretation of the evidence. Be-
yond that, Mrs. Steffensen has failed to show that any error in 
directing the verdict was substantial and prejudicial. 
B. IF THE DIRECTION OF A VERDICT IN THIS MATTER WERE ERROR, THE 
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS WOULD LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE 
ERROR WAS HARMLESS. 
Mrs. Steffensen cannot be permitted now, on her second ap-
peal, to cure the failure to properly present her case at trial. 
In order to prevail on this issue, she must show that any error 
was prejudicial in that it substantially affected the outcome of 
her case as it was presented to the jury. 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect 
in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties 
is ground for granting a new trial or other-
wise disturbing a judgment or order . . . The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceed-
ing which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added). Upon 
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appeal, the appellant has the burden of proving the prejudicial 
nature of the error, i.e. that there is "a reasonable likelihood 
that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Steffen-
sen v. Smith's at 489, quoting State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 
(Utah 1989). Note that the standard is "reasonable likelihood" 
not possibility. 
The Court of Appeals noted that the "the jury's verdict would 
not have differed had the trial judge not granted Smith's partial 
directed verdict." Steffensen v. Smith's at 490. In fact, the 
jury found that Smith's was negligent. 
Mrs. Steffensen has failed to present any evidence that, but 
for the directed verdict, the outcome would have been different. 
The evidence excluded by the directed verdict supported the claims 
of negligence. The jury found negligence. The true issues of 
proximate cause are unrelated to the evidence excluded by the 
directed verdict. Therefore, the outcome would not likely have 
been different—possibly perhaps, but not likely. 
Because there is no likelihood of a different outcome, any 
error in directing verdict is, as concluded by the Court of Ap-
peals, harmless error. 
POINT III 
THE SUBSTANCE OF JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 32 IS 
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH CASE LAW. EVEN IF GIV-
ING THE INSTRUCTION WAS ERROR, IT WAS HARM-
LESS. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 
130, 133 (Utah 1978) clarified the definition of foreseeability 
stating that it must be reasonably foreseeable "not that the par-
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ticular accident would occurf but only that there is a likelihood 
of an occurrence of the same general nature." The key to fore-
seeability is likelihood, not possibility. 
In Instruction No. 32, the trial court set forth the defini-
tion of foreseeability compatible with Rees. In the second para-
graph of the instruction, the court attempted to instruct the jury 
that the issue of foreseeability goes beyond mere possibility and 
more toward probability or predictability. Clarification of this 
element is consistent with the Rees definition that foreseeability 
is based upon likelihood, a standard higher than possibility. 
It is unfortunate that Mr. Burnett's name was specifically 
included in the instruction. This did not, however, force the 
jury to deal specifically with the actions of a single shoplifter. 
The instruction could just as easily have said: 
In determining what is foreseeable, you 
must determine that it was predictable and 
not merely a possibility that a shoplifter 
would flee and collide with plaintiff. 
The outcome would have been the same. Because Mr. Burnett was the 
shoplifter in question, the jury would naturally use his actions 
as the basis for their determination. That the jury might use the 
actions of Mr. Burnett as the basis for determining the issue of 
foreseeability does not make the instruction erroneous. 
The Court of Appeals noted that "Mrs. Steffensen's experts 
testified that approximately five percent of all shoplifters, when 
apprehended, run." Steffensen v. Smith's at 489. Undeniably a 
five percent occurrence falls more in the realm of possibility 
than of likelihood or probability. No evidence was given of the 
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occurrence of customer injury when a shoplifter runs (the shop-
lifter who runs is trying to get away and not run into people), 
but it is certainly less than 100% and probably less than 50%. If 
injuries occur in fewer than 50% of instances where the shoplifter 
runs, that also falls in the realm of possibility. Where there is 
a possibility of a possibility, the likelihood standard of fore-
seeability is clearly not met. 
Even if Instruction No. 32 were erroneous, it is unlikely 
that the jury would find the injury foreseeable by the Rees stan-
dard. Mrs. Steffensen has failed to present evidence that, but 
for the erroneous jury instruction, the outcome would likely have 
been in her favor. Again, the mere possibility of a different 
verdict is insufficient. Because the outcome would not be differ-
ent, any such error must be deemed harmless and therefore non-
reversible. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding any error 
in Instruction No. 32 to be harmless. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY UPHELD THE 
TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS EXCLUDING 
THE EVIDENCE OF MRS. STEFFENSEN'S EXPERT. 
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING ERROR IN EXCLUDING 
EVIDENCE AS TO SMITH'S TRAINING PROGRAM, BUT WAS CORRECT IN 
CONCLUDING THE ALLEGED ERROR TO BE HARMLESS. 
The trial court has broad discretion to decide whether or not 
evidence submitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 
1286, 1290 (Utah 1976). If the evidence is not relevant, it is 
inadmissible. Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. Even if the 
evidence is relevant, it may be excluded at the discretion of the 
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court. Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence; Terry v. Zions Coopera-
tive Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 304, 322 (Utah 1979). It is 
up to the trial court to balance the questions of probative value 
against prejudicial or confusing effects. State v. Gibson, 565 
P.2d 783, 786-7 (Utah 1977). When it comes to evidence, "It is 
generally conceded the trial court is more competent in the exer-
cise of this discretion, to judge the exigencies of a particular 
case." Terry v. Zions at 322. The judgment of the trial court 
may not be reversed absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Gibson at 787; Bambrough v. Bethers at 1290. 
As observed by the trial court in chambers, the evidence 
related to Smith's training program was irrelevant to the liabil-
ity questions surrounding the detention of Mr. Burnett. 
" [ I ] f they had the worst training program in 
the world but the situation were handled ade-
quately, there would be no liability here. . 
. And if the situation is handled improperly, 
it doesn't matter whether they have the best 
training program in the world, the thing is 
how it was handled. If they had an inadequ-
ate training program, but it was still han-
dled properly, that's not the proximate cause 
of anything." 
(T. 339-340). 
Even if the testimony about the training program were rele-
vant, it would serve no purpose and was likely to confuse the jury 
and distract them from the core issues of the case. As such, the 
evidence was inadmissible at the discretion of the court. 
Mrs. Steffensen failed to demonstrate before the Court of 
Appeals that exclusion of the testimony was a clear abuse of dis-
cretion. The Court of Appeals should not, therefore, have substi-
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tuted its judgment for that of the trial court and should have 
upheld the trial court's evidentiary ruling. 
Even so, the Court of Appeals was correct in noting that the 
jury found Smith's negligent, making any error harmless. Steffen-
sen v. Smith's at 491. 
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S EX-
CLUSION OF TESTIMONY FROM MRS. STEFFENSEN'S EXPERT AS TO 
APPORTIONMENT OF NEGLIGENCE. 
Mrs. Steffensen argues that her expert should have been per-
mitted to testify because Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence permits 
opinion testimony even if it reaches a legal conclusion. It is 
true that the testimony of an expert is generally admissible even 
if it deals with the ultimate issues of the case. The ultimate 
issue argument does not apply here, however. There is no legal 
consensus taking the same position regarding the question of ap-
portionment. In fact, Utah law holds the issue of apportionment 
of fault as a matter for the jury. Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 
531 (Utah 1979). Although apportionment may, by strict defini-
tion, be an "ultimate issue," it goes beyond determination of 
negligence and is a function restricted to the jury. 
Even if expert witness testimony were deemed admissible on 
the question of apportionment, Mrs. Steffensen failed to provide 
proper foundation for her expert's qualifications to apportion 
fault. Lacking proper foundation, the expert's testimony would be 
inadmissible. Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979). 
Again, the proper standard for reversing an exclusion of 
evidence is clear abuse of discretion. Mrs. Steffensen made no 
such showing before the Court of Appeals nor has she done so here. 
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The trial court properly excluded the expert witness testimo-
ny and the Court of Appeals correctly upheld that exclusion. 
POINT V 
MRS. STEFFENSEN HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 
PREJUDICE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY REVERSAL OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY DECISIONS ON THE 
BASIS OF ERROR. 
Where an exclusion of evidence does not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties, a judgment cannot be disturbed and the 
court must disregard the error. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The appellate court may reverse the trial court's 
judgment only "if there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent 
the error, there would have been a result more favorable to the 
[appellant]." Matter of Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah 
1985), citing Lee v. Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance Serv.. 606 
P.2d 259, 261 (Utah 1980) and Rowley v. Graven Bros, 26 Utah 2d 
448, 451, 491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971). As noted above, a rever-
sible error must be "substantial and prejudicial" and the appel-
lant has the burden of showing that error. Steffensen v. Smith's 
at 489. See also Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 563 
P.2d 1247, 1251, n.ll (Utah 1977); Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974). The mere fact 
that a verdict was entered against Mrs. Steffensen is insufficient 
to show prejudicial error. She must clearly demonstrate that the 
outcome would have been different and in her favor. 
Mrs. Steffensen has failed to show that she was prejudiced by 
the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The only implications that 
the outcome would have been different lie in her conclusory state-
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ments to that effect. Not only has she failed to show prejudice, 
Mrs. Steffemsen has failed to demonstrate the substantial preju-
dice required by Rule 61, U.R.C.P. and by Utah case law. There-
fore, even if this court finds error in the trial court's eviden-
tiary rulings or the holdings of the Court of Appeals, that error 
is not reversible. 
CONCLUSION 
The only serious error committed by the Court of Appeals was 
its failure to properly analyze the basis for granting a directed 
verdict leading to the conclusion that directed partial verdict 
was improper. This portion of the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals should be reversed. 
Even if errors occurred as outlined by Mrs. Steffensen, she 
has failed to meet the burden of establishing substantial preju-
dice or showing clear abuse of discretion sufficient to overcome 
the trial court's rulings or challenge the Court of Appeals deci-
sion in this case. Because any errors are harmless errors, the 
overall decision of the Court of Appeals' affirmation should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted the J^f day of July, 1992. 
Hstfristopher A. Tolboe 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
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